MyRecon OSINT
RailYatri
On 26 December 2022, RailYatri was breached. 23,209,732 accounts were exposed, including email addresses, genders, names. MyRecon rates it 64/100, severe. That is about 86% of the population of Australia.
No passwords, no payment data, no identity documents, by the standards of this archive the field list is mild. The travel data is what makes it worth reading carefully anyway. Tickets purchased, with routes and fares, is a movement history: where a person goes, how often, in which class, and on which dates.
For most passengers that is a privacy loss rather than a security one. For some it is not. A record of regular journeys between two towns identifies where someone lives and where they work, or who they visit, with a precision that no amount of careful social media hygiene would have given away. Anyone who has moved away from a person they needed to get away from should treat that as the real exposure here.
The immediate practical risk, though, is phone-based. A name, a mobile number and a genuine recent booking is everything a convincing scam call needs, refunds for cancelled trains, fare adjustments, seat upgrades, all referencing a journey the recipient actually took. Indian users in particular have seen sustained campaigns of exactly this shape. No travel operator resolves a refund by asking for a one-time code or a UPI approval; anyone who does is stealing.
The story behind the breach
In December 2022, India’s government-approved online travel agency RailYatri suffered a data breach . The incident impacted over 31M customers and exposed 23M unique email addresses. Also impacted were names, genders, phone numbers and tickets purchased, including travel information and fares.
Breach description from Have I Been Pwned, used under a CC BY 4.0 licence.
How did it happen?
The published account does not explain the exact way the data was obtained.
What was the motive?
The published account does not establish the motive. We cannot tell what the attackers intended from the exposed data alone.
Reported demands or attempts to sell data describe what happened, rather than prove every attacker's intention.
What was the outcome?
23,209,732 accounts are listed in this breach. This is a count of accounts, not necessarily individual people.
The reported exposed data includes Email addresses, Genders, Names, Phone numbers, Purchases.
What was exposed, and why it matters
- Email addressesThe address becomes a confirmed, active target, expect more phishing, better aimed.
- GendersSmall on its own; useful to anyone assembling a fuller profile.
- NamesTurns an anonymous address into an identified person, which is what makes targeted phishing possible.
- Phone numbersEnables SIM-swap attacks against SMS two-factor codes, and puts the number on scam-call lists indefinitely.
- PurchasesWhat was bought and when, detail that makes an impersonation convincing.
What to do if you were in it
- Move two-factor authentication off SMS and onto an authenticator app, which a SIM swap cannot intercept.
- Expect better-aimed phishing. A message that already knows your name and where you have an account is the whole point of a breach like this.
Questions people ask about this breach
Was my email address in the RailYatri breach?
Use the email box on this page. The result applies only to this incident. If the provider does not cover this breach, we say so. A missing match does not prove you were unaffected.
What data was leaked in the RailYatri breach?
email addresses, genders, names, phone numbers, purchases. Each one is explained above, along with what it means for the person it belongs to.
When did it happen, and when did it become public?
The breach is dated 26 December 2022. It was published to Have I Been Pwned on 5 December 2023, a gap of 344 days during which the data was already out.
Is the RailYatri breach real?
Yes. Have I Been Pwned lists it as verified, meaning the data was checked against the source rather than taken on trust.
How many people were affected?
23,209,732 accounts. That is about 86% of the population of Australia. That is accounts rather than people, one person often has several.
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Three kinds of content appear on this page and they are kept apart deliberately. The breach description is quoted from Have I Been Pwned under its licence. The severity score, the field-by-field explanation and the advice are computed from the record itself, every sentence derives from a number or a flag in it, which is what stops the analysis drifting from the evidence. Anything under the "MyRecon's take" byline is editorial: our reading of this breach, presented as opinion rather than as a finding.