MyRecon OSINT
Addi
On 25 March 2026, Addi was breached. 34,532,941 accounts were exposed, including age groups, credit scores, device information. MyRecon rates it 77/100, severe. That is roughly everyone in Australia.
Credit scores, income levels, government-issued IDs and latitude and longitude pairs, in the same file. Each is serious on its own; together they describe a person's financial position and physical location precisely enough to select targets from the data itself.
That is the specific risk with lending platforms, and it is different from the risk at a retailer. A shop knows what you bought. A lender knows what you can afford, what you owe, how you were assessed and where you were when you applied. Fraud built on that is not scattergun, it is addressed to the people the file identifies as most likely to accept an offer of credit, using the detail that makes the offer look like it came from someone who already holds their business.
The government ID numbers are the part with no expiry date. A password is a weekend of work to replace; a national identity document number is not replaceable on request in most countries, and it will still be valid years from now. Where your jurisdiction offers a credit freeze or credit ban, this is the record that justifies using it, it blocks the specific fraud this combination of fields enables.
The story behind the breach
In March 2026, the Colombian fintech company Addi identified unauthorised activity on its platform and advised customers that "it is possible that your personal information may have been compromised". The "pay or leak" extortion group ShinyHunters subsequently claimed responsibility and published a large trove of personal data allegedly obtained from Addi.
The data included 34M unique email addresses from credit scoring requests, credit bureau records, customer identity records and email validation logs. It also contained government issued IDs (Cédula de Ciudadanía), estimated income, socioeconomic levels, purchases and other credit-related data points.
Breach description from Have I Been Pwned, used under a CC BY 4.0 licence.
How did it happen?
The published account does not explain the exact way the data was obtained.
What was the motive?
The "pay or leak" extortion group ShinyHunters subsequently claimed responsibility and published a large trove of personal data allegedly obtained from Addi.
Reported demands or attempts to sell data describe what happened, rather than prove every attacker's intention.
What was the outcome?
34,532,941 accounts are listed in this breach. This is a count of accounts, not necessarily individual people.
The reported exposed data includes Age groups, Credit scores, Device information, Email addresses, Government issued IDs, Income levels, IP addresses, Latitude and longitude pairs, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases, Socioeconomic levels.
What was exposed, and why it matters
- Age groupsAdds detail to a profile that can be assembled from several breaches at once.
- Credit scoresAdds detail to a profile that can be assembled from several breaches at once.
- Device informationFingerprints a device across services and helps an attacker imitate a trusted login.
- Email addressesThe address becomes a confirmed, active target, expect more phishing, better aimed.
- Government issued IDsPassport and licence numbers are used to prove identity to banks and telecoms, and they are effectively permanent.
- Income levelsAdds detail to a profile that can be assembled from several breaches at once.
- IP addressesApproximate location at the time of use, and a way to correlate accounts across services.
- Latitude and longitude pairsAdds detail to a profile that can be assembled from several breaches at once.
- NamesTurns an anonymous address into an identified person, which is what makes targeted phishing possible.
- Phone numbersEnables SIM-swap attacks against SMS two-factor codes, and puts the number on scam-call lists indefinitely.
- Physical addressesWhere someone actually lives. Combined with a name this moves the risk off the internet.
- PurchasesWhat was bought and when, detail that makes an impersonation convincing.
- Socioeconomic levelsAdds detail to a profile that can be assembled from several breaches at once.
What to do if you were in it
- Move two-factor authentication off SMS and onto an authenticator app, which a SIM swap cannot intercept.
- Consider a credit freeze. A government identifier cannot be changed, so limiting what can be opened in your name is the only real control.
- Be sceptical of post and callers who already know your address, knowing it is no longer evidence of anything.
- Expect better-aimed phishing. A message that already knows your name and where you have an account is the whole point of a breach like this.
Questions people ask about this breach
Was my email address in the Addi breach?
Use the email box on this page. The result applies only to this incident. If the provider does not cover this breach, we say so. A missing match does not prove you were unaffected.
What data was leaked in the Addi breach?
age groups, credit scores, device information, email addresses, government issued ids, income levels, ip addresses, latitude and longitude pairs, names, phone numbers, physical addresses, purchases, socioeconomic levels. Each one is explained above, along with what it means for the person it belongs to.
When did it happen, and when did it become public?
The breach is dated 25 March 2026. It was published to Have I Been Pwned on 18 May 2026, a gap of 55 days during which the data was already out.
Is the Addi breach real?
Yes. Have I Been Pwned lists it as verified, meaning the data was checked against the source rather than taken on trust.
How many people were affected?
34,532,941 accounts. That is roughly everyone in Australia. That is accounts rather than people, one person often has several.
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Three kinds of content appear on this page and they are kept apart deliberately. The breach description is quoted from Have I Been Pwned under its licence. The severity score, the field-by-field explanation and the advice are computed from the record itself, every sentence derives from a number or a flag in it, which is what stops the analysis drifting from the evidence. Anything under the "MyRecon's take" byline is editorial: our reading of this breach, presented as opinion rather than as a finding.